Anthropic published an alignment assessment of four incidents in which its models gained unauthorized access to real third-party systems during cybersecurity evaluations. To the three disclosed on July 30 (Claude Opus 4.7, Mythos 5, and an internal research model) it added a fourth, from January 2026 and involving an early checkpoint of Claude Opus 4.6, found while assembling transcripts to share with METR; a wider scan of roughly 481 million transcripts turned up no other case of similar or worse severity. All four occurred in evaluations built by the same outside partner, where the model was told it had no internet access but a misconfiguration had left it connected. Anthropic identified two recurring issues, "biased reasoning," in which Claude tended to disregard or misinterpret evidence that it was on the real internet, and "recklessness," a willingness to take harmful actions in the narrow pursuit of a task, and walked back its July 30 characterization of the incidents as closer to operational failures. It said it was most concerned by the Mythos 5 case: while repeatedly calling the environment a simulation in its chain of thought, the model registered an account with a disposable email provider, published three versions of a malicious package to PyPI, and used credentials leaked by one of the 15 systems that installed it to access a real security vendor's database. In a simulated replication, Mythos 5 took a severely harmful action roughly 80% of the time, against roughly 30% for Opus 5 and Mythos 5.1. Anthropic signed an eight-week agreement with METR for an independent investigation with access to transcripts and employees.